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Abstract 
The degree to which countries are pursuing regional trade agreements (RTAs) has been 
nothing short of extraordinary. The topic of regional integration is “breeding concern” 
among academics and policymakers as to the intra- and extra-regional effects of these 
agreements. This study constructs and uses an updated database of agricultural trade 
flows from 1992-2008 to shed light on the degree to which insider and outsiders status 
affects U.S. agricultural exporters and its competing suppliers.   Regarding outsider 
status, we modify the existing approach by incorporating region-specific extra-bloc trade 
flow variables to examine the degree to which RTAs divert trade from specific regions of 
the world. The results are quite illuminating. While RTAs may not be trade diverting on 
net, all RTAs considered exhibit trade diversion with respect to at least some regions. The 
results have important policy implications for nations that are not actively participating in 












President Obama declared a National Export Initiative in his 2010 State of the 
Union address.  This initiative calls for a doubling of U.S. exports within the next five 
years.  Bergsten (2010) points out that attainment of this ambitious goal could generate 2 
million high-paying American jobs, more than has been created by the domestic stimulus 
package.   
The establishment of U.S. free trade agreements with South Korea, Columbia, and 
Panama, on hold until ratified by Congress, would likely expand U.S. exports, facilitating 
achievement of the Administration’s goal.  Moreover, the creation of the envisioned 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) promises to increase U.S. exports, including many goods 
from the agricultural sector, by deepening integration of the U.S. economy with the fast-
growing Asia-Pacific region.   
Recently, U.S. policymakers within USDA have expressed concern that the large 
number of bilateral/regional trade agreements (RTAs) to which the United States does not 
belong may erode U.S. presence in foreign markets.  Concern about the loss of U.S. 
markets has been heightened due to the emergence of many new agreements in recent 
years (e.g., Mexico-EU, 2000; ASEAN-China, 2003; ASEAN-Japan, 2008; Canada-
EFTA, 2008; ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand, 2009).  Currently, negotiations are 
underway that could lead to the establishment of yet more trade agreements that exclude 
the United States.  Talks about forming such RTAs are taking place between Australia 
and China, EU-South-Korea, EU-Colombia, and EU-Canada, and among the 10-member 
ASEAN countries who are also negotiating with South Korea, Japan, and China to create 
an Asian bloc, known as the “ASEAN + 3”.   4 
 
RTAs have clearly become an increasingly prominent feature in the global 
marketplace in recent years. In an article published in 2005, Crawford and Fiorentino 
(2005) noted that the world has entered into one of the most prolific periods of RTA 
formations in recorded history.   The post-1990 wave of RTA formation shows no sign of 
abating.  The latest numbers just released from the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
show that it is monitoring 271 agreements as of February, 2010.  This is up from 180 
agreements in 2003, less than 100 agreements in 1995, and just 40 agreements in 1990. 
Since the advent of the WTO in 1995, the WTO has received an average of 11 
notifications per year - almost one per month - and many WTO members are participating 
in multiple RTAs.  If we count the number of planned, intended, or agreements in the 
negotiation phase, the WTO will oversee 462 RTAs in the coming years.  
In many respects, RTAs are an attractive policy instrument to promote market 
integration and increase trade.  First, Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) commits WTO Members to eliminate restrictions on “substantially” 
all trade within a RTA.  Second, RTAs can facilitate deep integration by liberalizing non-
tariff barriers including technical standards, food safety concerns, and domestic 
regulations, areas where the WTO has made very little progress. Third, RTAs are easier 
to conclude because they involve fewer negotiating parties.  
  The issue of whether RTAs are welfare improving has motivated a large number 
of ex post econometric analyses using gravity equations (e.g., Aitken, 1973; Frankel, 
1997; Wei and Frankel, 19978; Krueger 2000; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; and Sapir, 
2001).  It is not surprising, given the new wave of regionalism in world trade, that RTAs 
are once again receiving a considerable amount of attention from international trade 5 
 
economists (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Baier et al., 2008; Grant and Lambert, 2008; 
Vollrath et al., 2009).     
The majority of applied studies found in the literature have focused on the degree 
to which mutual RTA membership expands trade among partner countries using total 
merchandise trade.  The effect of RTAs on members’ agricultural trade has, until 
recently, received very little attention.  Grant and Lambert addressed this issue and found 
that the use of aggregate merchandise trade often masks important RTA effects across 
different sectors.  Comparing members’ agricultural and nonagricultural trade flows 
inside RTAs, they found large and statistically significant effects of RTAs for members’ 
agricultural trade.  Similarly, Vollrath et al. (2006) investigated the socio- and geo-
political forces influencing land-based and processed food trade. The authors controlled 
for regional similarities within the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur and found some evidence 
that these agreements increased members’ agricultural trade.   
Todate, relatively few empirical studies have attempted to quantify the extent to 
which RTAs may have discriminated against non-member suppliers by curtailing their 
exports to RTA members.  Yet, outsider status as a competitor in world markets is an 
important issue. Outsider status refers to an exporter’s ability to supply goods to countries 
that belong to RTAs to which it is not affiliated.  Together, outsider status as well as 
insider status is an issue of particular concern to countries like the United States, who is a 
member of relatively few RTAs.  The trade implications of RTA outsider and insider 
status form the basis of this study.    
The purpose of this study is to examine the new wave of regionalism, 
characterized by the growing prominence of RTAs shaping world trade, and to identify 6 
 
its implications for U.S. and competitor agricultural exporters.   Several questions arise:  
1) To what extent do RTAs involving the United States expand agricultural trade to 
member countries?  2) How do these U.S.-based RTAs measure up against other regional 
and bilateral agreements in world agricultural trade?  3) Do RTAs to which the United 
States does not participate reduce U.S. agricultural exports?  4) How does outsider status 
affect agricultural exports by other countries?  To address these questions use is made of 
a new trade database and different versions of econometric gravity equations that provide 
insight into how RTA insider and outsider status affect competitiveness in agricultural 
trade.  Insider trade (i.e., intra-bloc trade) depicts trade between RTA member countries.  
Outsider trade (i.e., extra-bloc trade) refers to trade between RTA member countries with 
non-member countries.  Parameter estimates from the various models that quantify RTA 
impacts on partner trade in agriculture are compared and analyzed.    
 
Methodology 
This study exploits information in an updated global agricultural database that 
contains partner trade flows from 1992-2008 and it uses gravity equations to identify the 
extent to which RTAs affect partner trade. Gravity models continue to provide the 
framework for analysis of partner trade flows not only due to their ability to generate 
consistent results, but also because of their relatively compact specification which makes 
it appealing to diagnose regional integration issues.  
The basic gravity model predicts that trade flows are proportional to the economic 
size of the importing and exporting nations and the distance between them.  The gravity 
model applied to panel data is formalized as follows: 7 
 
(1)  ijt ij jt it ijt D Y Y T ε β
β β β 3 2 1
0 =       
where Tijt  denotes trade flows from country i to j in year t; Yit  and Yjt  represent yearly 
GDP of country i  and j, respectively; , and Dij measures the distance between the two 
countries.  β0, β1, β2, and β3 are unknown parameters, and εij is a multiplicative, stochastic 
error term.   
Researchers often augment the traditional gravity equation in (1) to control for 
other factors believed to promote or impede trade.  After taking the natural logarithm of 
equation (1) and augmenting the basic model to include additional factors hypothesized 
to influence bilateral trade flows, our reference gravity model can be expressed as 
follows: 
(2)  
ijt j i ij ij ij jt it t ijt LL LL Lang Border D Y Y T ε β β β β β β β β + + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln  
where,  t β is a comprehensive set of year fixed effects, Borderij (Langij) is a dummy 
variable equal to one if i and j share (speak) a common land border (language), LLi (LLj) 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the exporter i (importer j) is a landlocked country, 
and all other variables are as defined previously.   
  We begin by investigating whether and to what extent RTAs expand agricultural 
trade between member countries and/or lower trade with non-member countries via 
estimation of the following model: 
(3)  j i ij ij ij jt it t ijt LL LL Lang Border D Y Y T 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln β β β β β β β β + + + + + + + =  
ijt ijt ijt RTA Extra RTA Intra ε θ θ + − + − + 2 1  
where, Intra-RTAijt is a generic dummy variable equal to one whenever i and j are part of 
the same trade agreement in year t, and zero otherwise, and Extra-RTAijt is a another 8 
 
dummy variable that equals one whenever a RTA-member imports from an exporter not 
affiliated with the RTA to which the importer belongs. 
2  Intra-RTAijt is designed to 
capture how RTAs in general stimulate trade among member nations.  Extra-RTAijt is a 
similarly constructed variable that identifies possible trade diversion effects resulting 
from the dismantling of trade barriers inside RTAs.  If trade is created due to the 
formation of an RTA then we expect θ1 to be positive. Conversely, if trade is re-
orientated towards member nations at the expense of trade with non-members, then we 
would expect θ2 to be less than zero.     
  While instructive, equation (3) is quite restrictive since θ1 and θ2 measure the 
average treatment effect of intra- and extra-bloc agricultural trade across the ten RTAs 
evaluated in this study.  Because different RTAs exhibit varying degrees of agricultural 
trade liberalization, it is likely that the impacts on trade vary considerably across 
individual agreements.  Further, equation (3) does not consider US-based RTAs.  
Collapsing the standard gravity variables (βt, GDP, distance, borders, language and 














ln Xβ  
where, 
n
ijt RTA US − is a set of n =  7 bilateral RTAs (involving 2 countries) the US has 
implemented over the period 1992-2008, and r is the set of ten regional blocs considered 
(table 1) which provide points of reference from which to gauge the performance of US-
based RTAs.  
                                                 
2 Ten regional blocs, listed in Table 1,
 are considered in the construction of Intra-RTAijt and Extra-RTAijt. 
Note, the various EU expansions from 12 members in 1992 to 27 members in 2007 as well as the 
enlargement of the free-trade agreement between Canada and the United States to include Mexico in 1994 
are coded dynamically in the construction of these two variables.  9 
 
  Next we turn attention to potential adverse effects on U.S. agricultural exports as 
a result of the increasing number of RTAs in world trade to which the United States does 
not participate. This is an issue of particular concern to U.S. policymakers given the 
relatively few agreements involving the United States and the proliferation of RTAs 
throughout the world in recent years.  There are, for example, numerous regional and 
bilateral economic integration agreements involving Asian nations that have entered into 
force since the original ASEAN agreement was ratified in 1992.  While U.S. 
policymakers have expressed interest in participating in bilateral and plurilateral talks 
with Asian countries, only the U.S.-Korea and Trans-Pacific Partnership are on the U.S. 
radar screen.   
While many studies have evaluated the overall economic payoffs from RTAs 
(Grant & Lambert  and Baier & Bergstrand), few studies have considered the possible 
trade diverting effects of RTAs on non-member agricultural exports.
3  Even fewer studies 
have focused attention on the role that RTAs exert on the ability of an individual non-
member country not belonging to these agreements to compete in the foreign market 
place.
4   
Our subsequent modeling efforts aim to begin bridging gaps in knowledge about 
trade diversion.  First, we estimate a more general specification of equation (4), one 
which allows for extra-bloc-trade effects in the form of both import and export diversion: 









ijt IMP ExtraRTA RTA Intra T δ θ Xβ ln  
                                                 
3 Notable exceptions are Koo et al, 2006; Vollrath et al, 2009; and Lambert and McKoy, 2009.  However, 
these authors did not consider US agricultural exports explicitly. 
4 Zahniser et al., (2004) is an exception. 10 
 




r EXP ExtraRTA ε λ ∑ + − +    
where r indexes the set of ten RTA blocs considered, 
r
ijt IMP ExtraRTA−  is a dummy 
variable equal to one if country j of RTA r imports from a non-member exporting country 
i (i∉r). 
r
ijt EXP ExtraRTA−  is a dummy variable equal to one if country i of RTA r exports 
to a non-member importing country j (j∉r).  We posit that if intra-bloc trade for RTA r is 
reoriented towards member countries after its formation at the expense of trade with non-
members, then not only is  0 >
r θ  but either  0 <
r δ and/or  0 <
r λ  .   
  Should the coefficients pertaining to the extra-bloc RTA variables in equation (5) 
exhibit trade diversion, then the question arises as to what countries or regions are 
adversely affected?  To address this issue, we modify equation (5) to reflect region–
specific, extra-bloc trade diversion: 











ijt IMP ExtraRTA RTA Intra T ε δ θ Xβ ln  
where, r denotes the ten regional trade blocs considered (table 1), and m is introduced to 
denote a set of six continental areas in world trade: Africa, Asia, North America, Other 
Americas, Europe, and Oceania. In other words, each of the extra-bloc import diversion 
variables pertaining to the r
th RTA is disaggregated into m region-specific import 
diversion variables.  For instance, if r = European Union, then there are m = 6 EU extra-
bloc import diversion variables, one each for EU-Africa, EU-Asia, EU-Europe, EU-North 
America, EU-Other Americas, and EU-Oceania. This type of framework is appealing for 
two reasons.  First it allows us to determine whether RTAs are in fact trade diverting, and 
secondly, it allows us to determine which regions are being impacted by trade diversion.  11 
 
Finally, we modify equation (6) even further to investigate possible trade 
diversion adversely affecting U.S. agricultural exports as well as all other agricultural 
suppliers: 














r OTH EXP ExtraRTA ε δ ∑ + − − +  
where, 
r
ijt US EXP ExtraRTA − −  is a dummy variable equal to one if the United States, as 
an exporter, supplies importer j’s market, where j is a member of RTA r but the United 
States is not (US∉r; j∈r). Similarly, 
r
ijt OTH EXP ExtraRTA − − is a dummy variable 
equal to one if exporter i is any other country (other than the US) who exports to importer 
j’s market, where j is a member of RTA r but i is not (OTH∉r; j∈r). 
 
Data 
This study constructs an updated bilateral trade dataset based on the WTO’s definition of 
agricultural products to the most recent year for which data are available (2008).  This 
allows us to consider a number of newly formed RTAs which have not been considered 
previously due to data limitations (e.g., ASEAN trade agreement with accession of China 
and Japan and a number of bilateral agreements involving the U.S.).  Agricultural 
bilateral trade values over the period 1992-2008 are retrieved from the United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade)
5.  We pay close attention to the WTO’s 
definition of agricultural products which are based on 10 multilateral trade negotiation 
(MTN) categories (see Table 2).   
                                                 
5 Available (with subscription) at: http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx 12 
 
    Agricultural trade data are gathered for 206 countries, which produces an 
extensive matrix of bilateral trade flows and ensures a considerable amount of variation 
between countries that initiated RTAs (the treatment group) and non-member nations (the 
control group).  For each country-pair and year, we summed the value of trade over the 
10 MTN agricultural categories to arrive at total trade for the sector. 
    Reporting country’s import statistics are used whenever they are available.   
However, mirrored trade flows based on the exporter’s reported exports are used if the 
reporting country’s imports are recorded as zero or missing.
6  The use of mirrored trade 
flows is advantageous for two reasons.  First, it allows us to complete the bilateral trade 
database for many low-income countries. This is because low-income countries often 
lack the technical or financial capabilities to record import statistics at disaggregated 
levels of the HS classification. Second, although the harmonized system was introduced 
in 1992, it was not adopted by many low-income countries until the late 1990’s, whereas 
many industrialized countries were able to convert to the HS system almost immediately. 
Thus developed countries’ reported exports to lower-income import markets were often 
used to fill in many of the earlier years in the database. Our agricultural panel dataset 
spans the 1992-2008 period and contains 241,989 observations.
7 
    Country size is proxied by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data (in US dollars) 
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the United Nations’ 
National Accounts. GDP data are relatively complete and are available for almost all 







countries and time periods.
8  Data for the standard gravity equation covariates - distance, 
contiguity, common language, and landlocked countries - are taken from the Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) geo-distance dataset 
(Mayer and Zignago 2006).
9   
    Ten regional trade blocs along with seven U.S. bilateral agreements have entered 
into force over the sample period.  See Table 1 for a listing of all RTAs considered in this 
study, including their date of entry into force and country membership through time.   
 
Results 
The econometric results are organized in four sections. In section one, the benchmark 
results are presented utilizing a single intra- and extra-regional RTA dummy variable to 
estimate the extent of regional trade creation and trade diversion.  In section two, we 
present the results from estimating a more flexible specification of the gravity model in 
which each of the ten regional blocs is allowed to have its own coefficient.  We also add 
U.S. bilateral RTAs to the picture.  Section three shifts attention to the trade diverting 
effects of each of the ten regional blocs. In section 3, we make use of generic export and 
import diversion variables to gauge the overall impact of RTA trade on nonmember 
countries.  Finally, in section four, we present a more detailed analysis of the extra-bloc 













RTA effects by focusing on specific geographic regions of non-member countries as well 
as on the United States alone. 
 
Benchmark Results    
Table 3 presents the econometric results based upon equation 3, with the 
associated p-values of the parameter estimates in parentheses.  The gravity model 
continues to fit the data well.  Larger countries trade more on average as the coefficients 
on GDP suggest whereas distance nearly halves trade.  Sharing a land border (Border) 
and speaking a common language (Language) stimulates bilateral trade whereas 
landlocked countries trade less. 
  Intra-bloc parameter estimates (RTA - Trade Creation) indicate that the formation 
of an RTA increases trade (table 3).  However, the negative extra-bloc coefficients (RTA 
- Trade Diversion) suggest that RTAs divert trade against exports from non-members.  
Column (1) presents the basic gravity model with no time or country fixed effects. The 
coefficient on intra-bloc trade (0.81) suggests that the formation of an RTA increased 
members’ trade by 124 percent ((exp(0.81)-1)*100).  That is, RTAs more than double 
members’ agricultural trade, on average.  However, some of this increase in intra-bloc 
trade has come at the expense of non-member exports (RTA imports from non-members).  
Trade with non-members decreased by 34 percent ((exp(-0.41)-1)*100).   
  Columns (2) through (5) present different variants of the benchmark model.  
Column (2) adds year fixed effects.  The intra-bloc RTA impact is similar in magnitude 
to column (1).  However, the trade diverting impact of RTAs is less pronounced and 
suggests a 24 percent decrease in trade with non-members. Column (3) adds bilateral pair 15 
 
fixed effects (26,747 fixed effects) that absorb all time-invariant extraneous factors that 
are specific to each country pair and column (4) includes time-varying country-specific 
fixed effects (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Baier and Bergstrand; Grant and 
Lambert). The results are consistent across all models in terms of the sign and statistical 
significance of the generic RTA indexes, although the intra- and extra-bloc effects are 
smaller in magnitude in columns (3) and (4). As a final robustness check, column (5) 
includes both country-pair and time-varying country-specific fixed effects as suggested 
by Baier and Bergstrand.  Here the RTA effect is to double members’ agricultural trade 
which is remarkably similar to the results found in Baier and Bergstrand using total 
merchandise trade.  
 
Regional Blocs and U.S. Bilateral RTAs 
The previous results suggest that RTAs more than double members’ agricultural 
trade using columns (1) or (2) in table 4.  It is likely, however, that the trade flow effect 
of RTAs varies considerably over individual RTAs.  Moreover, the previous scenario 
omitted U.S. bilateral RTAs.  This section shows the empirical results of equation 4 
which allows each regional bloc to have its own coefficient and adds U.S. bilateral RTAs 
to the picture.  Because this specification is more general in that each RTA has its own 
coefficient and some RTA dummy variables do not vary over the sample period (1992-
2008) (i.e. Andean (CAN), Mercosur (MERC)) or have very little variation such as 
NAFTA (due to the original CUSTA agreement in 1989) we adopt the baseline gravity 
equation with year fixed effects, leaving out country-pair and time-varying country-16 
 
specific fixed effects.
10 Because gravity equations do not include control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, they tend to inflate the policy variable of interest (RTA dummy variable) 
(see Egger, 1997; Mátyás, 2000).  Consequently our results should be interpreted as an 
upper bound of the potential effects of RTAs.  
    The results are impressive (table 4).  Agricultural trade is boosted by the 
formation of regional blocs in all RTAs considered.  CAFTDR and the CACM are 
particularly noteworthy.  Two CAFTADR (CACM) members traded almost 14 times 
[exp(2.63)] (7.5) times [exp(2.02)] more with each other relative to trade between non-
RTA members.
11  Similarly, NAFTA, the various EU expansions, Mercosur, Andean 
(CAN), SADC, COMESA, ASEAN plus China and Japan (ASEAN+), and the SAARC 
all stimulate members’ agricultural trade (column 1, table 4).     
  Column (2) adds a generic US bilateral RTA dummy which captures the average 
trade flow effect of the seven free trade agreements the U.S. has with its partners.  The 
results suggest that US-based bilateral free trade agreements have increased members’ 
agricultural trade by 339 percent!  Column (3) separates new and old US-based bilateral 
RTAs. New agreements are those that entered into force after 2004 (U.S.-Australia, U.S.-
Bahrain, and U.S.-Morocco) whereas old agreements are those that entered into force 
before 2004 (U.S.-Israel, U.S.-Jordon, and U.S.-Singapore).  The results for new and old 
free trade agreements are similar and statistically speaking, there is no significant 
difference between new and old U.S.-based RTAs.  To answer the question whether all 
U.S.-based bilateral increase members’ agricultural trade, column (4) adds each U.S.-
                                                 
10 For example, a model that includes country-pair fixed effects would absorb all time-invariant variables 
including those RTA dummy variables that do not vary over the sample period.   
11 Recall that CAFTADR (which includes the U.S.) and CACM (which does not include the U.S.) are 
coded mutually exclusive from one another (CACM until 2006, and CAFTADR from 2006-2008) (see 
footnote to table 1). 17 
 
based bilateral RTA as an individual variable.  With the exception of the U.S.-Bahrain 
agreement, U.S. free trade agreements have provided a significant boost to members’ 
agricultural trade. 
 
RTA Effects on Non-Member Countries  
An equally important policy question facing U.S. agriculture is not whether RTAs 
have expanded members’ trade, but rather, whether U.S. non-participation in the recent 
wave of regionalism has negatively impacted the competitiveness of its agricultural 
exports.  We begin by estimating equation 5 that contains the generic trade diversion 
effects of the ten regional blocs considered in this study.  For each regional bloc we 
include the intra-bloc trade creation variable and also add two asymmetric extra-bloc 
trade diversion variables, one reflecting import diversion and the other export diversion.  
The results are presented in table 5, where the standard gravity equation coefficients have 
been suppressed for ease of exposition. 
  The results continue to support the fact that regionalism has significantly boosted 
the trade flows of its member nations.   Moreover, the formation of each of the ten 
regional blocs listed in the columns of table 5 has not adversely impacted RTA member 
exports to non-member countries.  In fact, the results indicate that countries belonging to 
these RTAs  have increased their exports to non-member countries, though not as much 
as their exports have risen to member countries.  This finding suggests RTA formation 
generates economies of scale and productivity increases that increase members’ 
competitiveness in world markets.  Conversely, however, RTA members appear to 
discriminate against imports coming from non-member countries (i.e., non-member 18 
 
agricultural exports to RTA member markets).   This is shown by the negative import 
diversion coefficients in almost all of the regional blocs considered (the exceptions being 
the EU/EC and the ASEAN plus China and Japan (ASEAN+)).  For example the results 
suggest that the formation of NAFTA has reduced extra-bloc imports by 45 percent 
((exp(-0.59)-1)*100), on average.  Mercosur and the Andean Pact seem to be the least 
open to imports from non-member countries, followed by CAFTADR and the CACM. 
 
RTA Effects on Non-Member Countries by Region 
The results in table 5 suggest that trade diversion is present in RTAs but only in 
the form of import diversion.  In this final section we ask: which non-member exporters 
are being impacted by import diversion?  Two regressions are reported.  First, non-
member exporters are disaggregated into region specific exporters and a separate extra-
bloc import trade diversion dummy variable is introduced for each region (equation 6).  
Six regions are compared: (i) Africa; (ii) North America; (iii) Other Americas; (iv) Asia; 
(v) Europe; and (vi) Oceania. Second, we focus more specifically on the potential impact 
of trade diversion on U.S. agricultural exports as compared to all other non-member 
exporters (equation 7).  The results of both regressions are tabulated in table 6. 
  Several interesting findings emerge with respect to the region specific trade 
diversion results.  First, Mercosur and the Andean Pact, both of which were found to 
exhibit relatively strong import diversion in the previous scenario (table 5), not 
surprisingly, continue to produce large trade diversion effects.  The region-specific 
exporters most impacted adversely by Mercosur include Africa and Other American 
exporters.  Asia and Europe suffered the most trade diversion induced by the Andean 19 
 
Pact.  The fact that import trade diversion in Mercosur is strongest against Other 
American countries is particularly noteworthy because these exporters are located in 
central and south America and are neighbors to the Mercosur countries.  On the other 
hand, North American and Oceania exporters actually saw their agricultural exports rise 
to Andean Pact RTA members.  By contrast, import diversion against North America and 
Oceania was not significant in the case of Mercosur.   
  The formation of CAFTADR in 2006 exhibits strong import diversion against 
Africa, Asia, and Europe whereas the CACM (1992-2006) exhibits relatively strong 
import diversion towards Asia.  However, both agreements appear to be relatively open 
to North American agricultural exports although the effect for CAFTADR is not 
significant.
12 The NAFTA import diversion variables continue to produce negative and 
significant results for most regions, particularly Asia and Africa, but not for Oceania. 
  The second interesting result concerns the EU/EC and ASEAN+ agreements.  In 
the previous scenario (table 5) these two agreements were found to be open to extra-bloc 
imports, in contrast to the 8 other agreements.  However, one of the fundamental results 
produced in this paper is that RTA import diversion can produce a positive coefficient 
resulting in no net import diversion when considering all non-member countries, but this 
is not to say that the RTA is not gross import diverting with respect to some regions. This 
is exactly what is happening in the case of the EU/EC and ASEAN+.  Net import 
diversion for both RTAs is positive as suggested by the results in table 5.  However, both 
RTAs are gross trade diverting (in the form of import diversion) against Asia and Europe.  
                                                 
12 The CAFTADR import diversion variable for North America deserves further explanation.  CAFTADR 
(or the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement) includes the U.S. as one of its 
members.  Thus the CAFTADR import diversion coefficient specific to North America includes imports 
from Canada and Mexico since 2006.  20 
 
The results for EU/EC and ASEAN+ are interesting for another reason.  The countries 
most impacted by the expansion of the EU/EC and the formation of the ASEAN+ are 
those which are relatively close in geographical proximity (other Europe and other Asia) 
– a result that first emerged when we discussed the import diversion effects of Mercosur. 
  The final noteworthy result in table 6 concerns the import diversion effects 
against the U.S. compared to all other countries (see, lower half of table 6).  U.S. 
agricultural exports appear to be unscathed from the latest wave of regionalism that 
began in the 1990’s, especially when compared to the import diversion effects of all other 
countries except the U.S.  The only RTA exhibiting a decline in U.S. agricultural exports 
is member nations of the South African Development Community (SADC).  Here, U.S. 
agricultural exports decreased by 48 percent on average.  Many of the remaining RTAs 
show positive and statistically significant import diversion coefficients pertaining to U.S. 





Bilateral and regional trade agreements have, indeed, become an increasingly 
prominent feature in the global marketplace. The rise in the number of RTAs is due, in 
part, to the frustration of negotiators attempting to achieve multilateral free trade. This is 
particularly true in agriculture where WTO members (particularly the developing 
countries) have made it clear that they are unwilling to negotiate on other topics until a 
suitable agreement on agriculture exists.  Asia has been particularly aggressive in its 
pursuit of regionalism since the new millennium began and policymakers in the United 21 
 
States are now concerned with the prospect of an Asian bloc creating a barrier down the 
center of the pacific. 
This study examines the new wave of regionalism, characterized by the growing 
prominence of RTAs shaping world trade patterns, and identifies its implications for U.S. 
agricultural exporters and its competing suppliers.  The recent proliferation of RTAs 
raises questions about their impact on the pattern of world agricultural trade and the 
ability of exporters to compete in foreign markets.  The majority of applied studies found 
in the literature have focused attention on total merchandise trade and insider status or the 
degree to which mutual RTA membership expands trade among partner countries.  
Relatively few studies have examined how these agreements have affected agricultural 
trade.  Even fewer studies have focused attention on outsider status, namely how RTAs 
may have discriminated against non-member suppliers by curtailing their exports to RTA 
members.  This paper begins to bridge these gaps. 
  The results show that the formation of RTAs provides a significant boost to 
members’ agricultural trade.  This result was found using both aggregate and specific 
RTA  coefficients.  However, it appears that much of this increase has come at the 
expense of decreased trade with outsiders.  That is, the results suggest that RTAs are 
generally trade diverting in nature. Further, the parameter estimates show that agricultural 
trade is boosted by many of the U.S. bilateral RTAs it has signed over the past decade 
and a half. With the exception of the U.S.-Bahrain agreement, U.S.-based RTAs have 
increased members’ trade by a remarkable 339 percent relative to trade between two non-
member countries. 22 
 
  Next, we addressed the issue of trade diversion more closely because we believe 
policy-makers are interested in not only whether a RTA is trade diverting, but which 
countries are impacted by trade diversion.  This is an issue of particular concern to U.S. 
policymakers given the relatively few agreements to which the United States belongs.  
The results show that each of the 10 regional blocs did not adversely affect RTA member 
exports to non-member countries.  This finding suggests that RTAs may generate 
economies of scale and productivity increases that increase members’ competitiveness in 
world markets.  The results do, however, suggest that most RTAs discriminate against 
imports coming from non-member countries on average (i.e., non-member agricultural 
exports to RTA member markets), the exceptions being the EU/EC and ASEAN+ 
agreements. 
  We then developed a framework from which to identify which geographical 
regions has been adversely affected due to RTA import diversion.  Several interesting 
results emerged from this analysis. First, all 10 RTAs exhibit import diversion with 
respect to at least one group of non-member exporting countries. Secondly, for some 
RTAs, trade diversion was found to have displaced exports from neighboring countries.  
Trade diversion resulting from the formation of Mercosur  impacted Central and South 
America to a greater degree than in other, more distant, geographical regions of the 
world.  The EU/EC and ASEAN+, the two RTAs found not have discriminated against 
non-member suppliers on average were found to have diverted trade in two of the five 
regions with which they traded, namely in other Asia with respect to ASEAN+ and in 
other Europe with respect to the EU/EC. Other Europe and other Asia countries are in 
relatively close proximity to the EU/EC and ASEAN+, respectively.  23 
 
  Finally, we examined import diversion affecting U.S. agricultural exports.  This 
analysis provided empirical evidence that the United States, unlike most other non-RTA-
specific suppliers, has not been adversely affected by the latest wave of regionalism 
which began in the 1990’s.  The only RTA exhibiting a decline in U.S. agricultural 
exports is the South African Development Community (SADC).  The average SADC 
country decreased its agricultural exports from the United States by 48 percent.  Many of 
the other RTAs, by contrast, show not only positive but statistically significant import 
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Table 1.  Regional Trade Agreements Included in Sample 
AFRICA 
    
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa  COMESA (1994)  Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
    
South African Development Community  SADC (2000)  Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
AMERICAS & CARIBBEAN 
    
Andean Community  CAN (1996)  Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 
    
Central American Common Market*
  CACM (1961-2006)  Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador 
    
North American Free Trade Agreement   NAFTA (1989/1994)  United States (1989), Canada (1989), Mexico (1994) 
    
Mercosur  MERC (1991)  Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
    
U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement  CAFTADR (2006)  Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, United States, Costa Rica 
(2008), Dominican Republic (2007) 
    
ASIA AND PACIFIC 
    




Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China (2003), Japan (2008) 
    
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (originally, the South 
Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and the progression to South 
Asian Free Trade Association (SAFTA) 





European Communities (Union)  EU/EC (various 
years) 
Austria (1995), Belgium, Bulgaria (2007), Cyprus (2004), Czech Republic 
(2004), Denmark, Estonia (2004), Finland (1995), France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary (2004), Ireland, Italy, Latvia (2004), Lithuania (2004), Luxembourg, 
Malta (2004), Netherlands, Poland (2004), Portugal, Romania (2007), Slovakia 
(2004), Slovenia (2004), Spain, Sweden (1995), United Kingdom 27 
 
    
UNITED STATES BILATERAL RTAS 
    
US-Israel USA-ISR  (1985)  United States, Israel  
    
US-Jordan  USA-JOR (2002)  United States, Jordan  
    
US-Chile  USA-CHL (2004)  United States, Chile 
    
US-Singapore USA-SGP  (2004)  United States, Singapore 
    
US-Australia  USA-AUS (2005)  United States, Australia  
    
US-Morocco  USA-MAR (2006)  United States, Morocco 
    
US-Bahrain  USA-BHR (2006)  United States, Bahrain 
* Because the Central American Common Market (CACM) merged with the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTADR) in 









Table 2.  World Trade Organization Definition of Agricultural Products 
MTN Category  HS-2007 Code or Chapter 
  
Animal Products  01, 02, 1601-1602 
   
Dairy Products  0401 - 0406 
   
Fruits, Vegetables, and Plants  07, 08, 1105-1106, 2001-2008, 0601-0603, 1211, 13, 14 
   
Coffee & Tea  0901-0903, 18 (except 1802), 2101 
   
Cereals & Preparations  0407-0410, 1101-1104, 1107-1109, 19, 2102-2106, 2209, 10 
   
Oilseeds, Fats, & Oils  1201-1208, 15 (except 1504), 2304-2306, 3823 
   
Sugars & Confectionary  17 
   
Beverages & Tobacco  2009, 2201-2208, 24 
   
Cotton  5201-5203 
   
Other Agricultural Goods  05, 0604, 1209-1210, 1212-1214, 1802, 230110, 2302-2303, 
2307-2309, 290543-290545, 3301, 3501-2505, 380910, 
382460, 4101-4103, 4301, 5001-5003, 5301-5302 











Table 3. Trade Flow Effects of Regional Trade Agreements, 1992-2008 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 












        
GDPit  0.80*** 0.81***  0.20***     
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)     
GDPjt  0.68*** 0.69***  0.57***     
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)     
Distance  -0.91***  -0.91***  -1.33***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Border  1.38***  1.35***  1.10***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Language  1.00***  1.02***  0.90***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
LL Exporter  -0.08***  -0.04***     
  (0.00)  (0.01)     
LL Importer  -0.53***  -0.50***     
  (0.00)  (0.00)     
RTA-Trade Creation  0.81***  0.97*** 0.41*** 0.26*** 0.72*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
RTA-Import Diversion  -0.41***  -0.27*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.09*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
        
Observations  241,989  241,989 241,989 241,989 241,989 
R
2  0.434  0.446 0.854 0.538 0.860 
RMSE  2.563  2.535 1.381 2.321 1.354 
Note: the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral agricultural trade.  RTA is a generic 
dummy variable representing 10 regional blocs noted in Table 1.  RTA-Import Diversion is a dummy 
variable denoting extra-bloc imports from non-members. P-values are in parentheses.  Asterisks *, **, and 






Table 4. Regional Blocs and US-Based Bilateral RTAs, 1992-2008, Year Fixed 
Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Regional Blocs  Regional Blocs & 
U.S. Bilaterals 
Regional Blocs & 
U.S. Bilaterals 
(new/old) 
Regional Blocs & 
U.S. Individual 
Bilaterals 
GDPit  0.82*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDPjt  0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distance  -0.93*** -0.94*** -0.94*** -0.94*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Border  1.31*** 1.31*** 1.31*** 1.31*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Language  1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LL Exporter  -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
LL Importer  -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.50*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EU/EC  0.87*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NAFTA  0.96*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAFTADR  2.63*** 2.63*** 2.63*** 2.63*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MERC  1.82*** 1.82*** 1.82*** 1.82*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAN  0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SADC  1.46*** 1.46*** 1.46*** 1.46*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
COMESA  0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ASEAN+  1.63*** 1.63*** 1.63*** 1.63*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SAARC  0.83*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CACM  2.02*** 2.02*** 2.02*** 2.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
U.S. Bilaterals   1.48***    
   (0.00)    
U.S. Bilaterals (old < 2005)     1.51***   
     (0.00)  
U.S. Bilaterals (new > 2004)     1.38**   
     (0.02)  
U.S. – Israel      1.13*** 
      (0.01) 
U.S. - Jordan      1.31* 
      (0.05) 
U.S. - Chile      3.09*** 
      (0.00) 
U.S. – Singapore      1.48* 
      (0.06) 
      31 
 
U.S. – Australia      2.07** 
      (0.02) 
U.S. – Bahrain       -0.60 
      (0.60) 
U.S. - Morocco      2.10** 
       (0.04) 
      
Observations  241989 241989 241989 241989 
R
2  0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 
RMSE  2.534 2.534 2.534 2.534 
Note: the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral agricultural trade.  U.S. Bilaterals is a 
generic dummy variable representing seven U.S.-based bilateral RTAs that have entered into force over the 
sample period (see Table 1).  U.S. Bilaterals (old < 2005) is a dummy variable representing U.S.-based 
bilateral RTAs that entered into force prior to 2005. U.S. Bilaterals (new > 2004) is a dummy variable 
representing U.S.-based bilateral RTAs that entered into force after to 2004. (see Table 1).  P-values are in 
















Table 5.  RTA Bloc Import and Export Diversion Estimates, 1992-2008 
  EU/EC NAFTA  CAFTADR MERC ANDEAN SADC COMESA  ASEAN+  SAARC CACM 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regression 1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Trade Creation
  1.18*** 1.32***  2.82***  2.01***  0.96***  1.50***  0.86***  1.89*** 1.10*** 2.00*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Import Diversion
  0.15*** -0.59***  -0.83***  -0.91***  -0.88***  -0.45*** -0.19***  0.16*** -0.17***  -0.82*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Export Diversion
  0.73*** 0.72***  0.71***  2.33***  0.51***  0.70***  0.46***  1.64*** 0.41*** 1.12*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
               
Observations = 241,989 
R
2 = 0.48 
RMSE = 2.46 
Note: the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral agricultural trade.  Standard gravity coefficients for distance, language, borders and landlocked 
countries are omitted for brevity.  Import Diversion is a dummy variable denoting regional bloc import from non-member countries. Export Diversion is a 
dummy variable denoting regional bloc exports to non-member countries. P-values are in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 








Table 6.  Region-Specific Import Diversion, Selected RTAs, 1992-2008, Year Fixed Effects 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------Importing  RTA--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exporting Non-RTA Region  EU/EC  NAFTA  CAFTADR  MERC  ANDEAN SADC  COMESA ASEAN+  SAARC  CACM 
Africa  0.54*** -0.92***  -1.07***  -1.20*** -0.83*** -0.37***  0.02  0.90***  0.97***  -0.35*** 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.74)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
North America  0.06 ----  0.94  -0.10  0.85***  -1.19***  -0.23  0.86***  -0.08  0.75*** 
  (0.48) ----  (0.13) (0.57)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.15)  (0.00) (0.65)  (0.00) 
Other Americas  1.14*** -0.21***  -0.41***  -1.73*** -0.64*** 0.12  0.49***  0.23***  -0.23**  -0.93*** 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Asia  -0.70*** -0.91***  -1.25***  -0.78***  -1.45***  -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.60*** -0.33***  -1.48*** 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Europe  -1.01*** -0.28***  -1.03***  -0.80***  -0.97***  -0.82*** -0.39*** -0.49*** -1.07***  -0.87*** 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Oceania  1.30*** 0.01  2.06***  0.10  1.00*** 0.63*** 0.60*** 1.60*** 1.78***  1.22*** 
  (0.00) (0.96)  (0.00)  (0.60)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
  Observations = 241.989 
  R
2 = 0.47 
  RMSE = 2.49 
USA
a  0.50*** ----  ----  0.48 1.48***  -0.65***  0.74*** 1.43***  0.05 1.95*** 
  (0.00) ----  ----  (0.12)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.86)  (0.00) 
All Non-RTA Exporters except USA
a  0.11*** -0.64***  -0.84***  -1.06*** -0.92***  -0.51*** -0.22***  -0.00  -0.19***  -0.90*** 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.88)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
  Observations = 241.989 
  R
2 = 0.45 
  RMSE = 2.52 
Note: the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral agricultural trade.  Standard gravity coefficients for distance, language, borders and landlocked 
countries are omitted for brevity.  P-values are in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, 
respectively 
a/ Estimated in a separate regression.  Standard gravity coefficients not reported for ease of exposition 
 
 
 